

Bundeskartellamt

EU-China Trade Project (II) Leniency Policy and Practice

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what is the reason for setting up a leniency program ?

- > cartels are secret and by their nature difficult to discover
- > circumstancial evidence is often not enough to prove a cartel infringement
- leniency is a key factor for ensuring a more effective enforcement , an increased detection record and appropriate sanctions

what is the overriding principle ?

- > race for immunity at every stage of the procedure
- > create a strong incentive to cooperate
- > create a simple mechanism with clear rules and limited availability

what are the tools ?

- > immunity
- reduction of fines (leniency)

when and to whom do we grant immunity ?

- > to a whistleblower who is first to provide substantial evidence against a cartel
- cooperates fully and on a continuous basis
- had not been the sole ringleader of the cartel
- the cartel authority does not already have enough evidence to obtain a search warrant or
- > to a whistleblower who is first to approach the cartel authority
- the cartel authority does not (yet) have sufficient evidence to prove the offence; this evidence is provided by the whistleblower
- > no immunity has been granted to another whistleblower before

reduction of fines

- if whistleblower provides information which makes a significant contribution to proving the cartel
- cooperates fully and continuously

amount of reduction depends on

- sequence of application
- value of the contribution

! the value of the contribution overrides the sequence of application !

Obligation to cooperate

- > full and complete
 - > all evidence which is available to him and his employees (including former employees)
 - > name all employees involved and
 - > ensure that all employees cooperate fully and continuously
 - > must not be prompted by the cartel authority
- > continuously
 - > give evidence in court

failure to cooperate fully and continously:

- revocation of grant of immunity or leniency
- company which has cooperated later will benefit

further obligations

- end involvement in the cartel on request of the authority
- > must not tell own employees of the cooperation
- must not tell other participants of the cooperation until he is relieved from this obligation
- > must not destroy evidence

cartel authority will as a rule

- > not disclose the identity of the applicant until the Statement of Objections is issued
- > not disclose the contents of the application to private third parties

declaration to cooperate ("marker")

- in writing or orally
- in English or German
- > must contain minimum information on
 - > type of infringement (e.g. price cartel)
 - approximate duration (e.g. 2010 to date)
 - which product market (e.g. production of sugar)
 - which geographical market (e.g. national)
 - which participants (e.g. company A, B and C)
 - > general statement of willingness to cooperate is not sufficient !
 - > no anonymous leniency applications
 - > no joint leniency applications by two or more participants
- > only two possible contact persons in the authority
- institutionalized procedure within the authority (who has to inform whom)

cartel authority:

- > will confirm to applicant in writing that a marker has been placed
 - stating the date and time of receipt
 - stating the contents
 - esp. important in case the marker is set during a dawn raid

if applicant requests immunity:

- the cartel authority will inform him about his status (first/second ...)
- set a time limit for the drafting of a full leniency application (usually up to 8 weeks)
- application of leniency can be combined with bonus for settlement